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One of the main reasons that firms participate in alliances is to learn know-how and capabilities
from their alliance partners. At the same time firms want to protect themselves from the
opportunistic behavior of their partner to retain their own core proprietary assets. Most
research has generally viewed the achievement of these objectives as mutually exclusive. In
contrast, we provide empirical evidence using large-sample survey data to show that when
firms build relational capital in conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict,
they are able to achieve both objectives simultaneously. Relational capital based on mutual
trust and interaction at the individual level between alliance partners creates a basis for
learning and know-how transfer across the exchange interface. At the same time, it curbs
opportunistic behavior of alliance partners, thus preventing the leakage of critical know-how
between them.Copyright  2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Studies on alliances confirm a significant increase
in their use as a strategic device (Hergert and
Morris, 1987; Anderson, 1990; Ahuja, 1996).
Firms use alliances for a variety of reasons: to
gain competitive advantage in the marketplace,
to access or internalize new technologies and
know-how beyond firm boundaries, to exploit
economies of scale and scope, or to share risk
or uncertainty with their partners, etc. (Powell,
1987; Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). Learning
alliances, in which the partners strive to learn or
internalize critical information or capabilities from
each other, constitute an important class of such
alliances (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel,
1991; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). Yet,
these alliances also raise an interesting dilemma,
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as a firm that uses them also risks losing its
own core proprietary capabilities to its partners,
especially when these partners behave opportu-
nistically.
The transaction costs literature has emphasized
the relevance of partner opportunism in inter-
organizational relationships. Building upon it,
subsequent literature on learning alliances dubbed
them as a ‘learning race’ (Khannaet al., 1998)
in which partners often engaged in opportunistic
attempts to outlearn each other. This ‘race’ cre-
ates a significant tension for firms. On the one
hand, alliances may help a firm absorb or learn
some critical information or capability from its
partner. On the other, they also increase the
likelihood of unilaterally or disproportionately
losing one’s own core capability or skill to the
partner. Thus, firms are faced with the challenging
task of managing the balance between ‘trying to
learn and trying to protect.’ In contrast to the
transaction cost literature, recent alliance research
has highlighted the existence, and importance, of
inter-personal relationships and trust in alliance
or exchange situations (Ring and Van de Ven,
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1992; Gulati, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, and Per-
rone, 1998). We use this work to develop the
notion of relational capital, which refers to the
level of mutual trust, respect, and friendship that
arises out of close interaction at the individual
level between alliance partners. We suggest that
relational capital can help companies successfully
balance the acquisition of new capabilities with
the protection of existing proprietary assets in
alliance situations. On the one hand, relational
capital facilitates learning through close one-to-
one interaction between alliance partners. On the
other hand, it minimizes the likelihood that an
alliance partner will engage in opportunistic
behavior to unilaterally absorb or steal infor-
mation or know-how that is core or proprietary
to its partners.
Conflict is inherent in alliances because of
partner opportunism, goal divergence (Doz, 1996)
and cross-cultural differences, and using explicit
mechanisms to manage conflict will help firms to
deal with these difficulties. There has been a
general tendency in the alliance literature to link
formal governance mechanisms with the man-
agement of conflicts (Williamson, 1985). But
more recently, there is recognition that a combi-
nation of contractual and organizational mecha-
nisms (formal and informal) is more effective in
managing conflict (Doz, 1996; Dyer and Singh,
1998). In the context of alliances—areas rife with
potential opportunism—organizational mecha-
nisms to manage conflict can be particularly
important in addressing the dilemma discussed
earlier. First, effective conflict management could
enable partners to build relational capital that not
only facilitates learning but also limits partner
opportunism. Second, these processes can help in
protecting proprietary assets owing to their ability
to monitor and control partner behavior.
Relational capital, which is seen to be so
important at the dyadic level in alliances, can
be equally important in the context of alliance
networks. Scholars (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999)
have argued that strong interpersonal ties between
two organizations provide channels through which
partners learn about other firms’ competencies
and reliability. From this perspective, relational
capital that rests upon close interpersonal ties at
the dyadic level can also play an important role
in creating and building larger alliance networks.
First, it increases the probability that partners will
form more alliances with each other in the future.
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Second, it allows each firm to form new alliances
with other firms based on referrals that its part-
ners are ready to provide for it. Eventually, a
larger and richer alliance network can evolve on
the basis of strong relational capital at the dyadic
level between two partners.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
RESEARCH QUESTION
Strategic alliances can be defined as purposive
strategic relationships between independent firms
that share compatible goals, strive for mutual
benefits, and acknowledge a high level of mutual
dependence (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Gulati
(1995) defines an alliance as any independently
initiated interfirm link that involves exchange,
sharing, or co-development.
Three streams of research typify most of the
academic work on alliances. The first stream that
ttempts to explain the motivations for alliance
formation has put forth three rationales: strategic,
transaction costs related, and learning related.
Strategic considerations involve using alliances to
enhance a firm’s competitive position through
market power or efficiency (Kogut, 1988). Trans-
action cost explanations view alliance formation
as a means to reduce the production and trans-
action costs for the firms concerned (Williamson,
1985; Hennart, 1988). Learning explanations view
alliances as a means to learn or absorb critical
skills or capabilities from alliance partners. The
second stream of research focuses on the choice
of governance structure in alliances. Informed
largely by transaction cost economics, it argues
that governance in alliances mirrors the underly-
ing transaction costs associated with an exchange,
and that equity-based structures are more likely
under conditions of high transaction costs
(Pisano, Russo, and Teece, 1988; Pisano, 1989).
The third stream of research examines the effec-
tiveness and performance of alliances. It seeks
to identify factors that enhance or impede the
performance of either the alliance itself, or of the
alliance’s parent firms that are engaged in one
(Beamish, 1987; Harrigan, 1985; Koh and Venka-
traman, 1991; Merchant, 1997).
Despite their different emphases, existing
alliance research has begun to focus increasingly
on the phenomenon of learning in alliance situ-
ations. Learning in terms of accessing and acquir-
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ing critical information, know-how, or capabilities
from the partner is oft stated to be one of the
foremost motivations for alliance formation
(Hamel, 1991; Khannaet al., 1998). Alliances
are seen not only a means of trading access
to each others’ complementary capabilities—what
might be termed quasi-internalization—but also
as a mechanism to fully acquire or internalize
partner skills. Yoshino and Rangan (1995) state
that such learning is always an implicit strategic
objective for every firm that uses alliances. Given
the importance that firms place on forming
alliances to exploit learning opportunities,
researchers have begun to examine various factors
that might impact the learning process (Khanna
et al., 1998) and learning success (Hamel, 1991).
For example, it has been argued that equity-
based governance structures are better suited for
learning critical know-how or capabilities from
the partner (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman,
1996). Such alliances are especially seen as effec-
tive vehicles for learning tacit know-how and
capabilities as compared to nonequity-based con-
tractual arrangements because the know-how
being transferred or learnt is more organi-
zationally embedded (Kogut, 1988). Using case-
based research, Hamel (1991) also shows that
firms that possess a strong learning intent and
create an appropriate learning environment win
the so-called ‘Learning Race.’ Khannaet al.,
(1998) extend this stream of research to provide
an excellent analytical framework that describes
the dynamics of the learning process in such a
‘Learning Race.’ They show that firms’ incentives
to learn are driven by their expected pay-offs
that have complex, interdependent and dynamic
structures. Learning success is determined by the
amount of resources that firms allocate to learn
from their alliance partner. The resource allo-
cation is itself dependent upon the expected pay-
offs associated with such learning. The magnitude
of these pay-offs is also linked to the degree
of overlap between alliance scope and parent
firm scope.
We believe that there is sufficient opportunity
to extend current research on learning alliances.
Current alliance research has failed to sufficiently
address, theoretically and empirically, an
important dilemma that often exists in learning
alliances. Participants in learning alliances would
not only like to access some useful information
or know-how from the partner, but also inter-
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nalize some complementary capabilities and skills
possessed by the partner. At the same time, they
would also like to protect some of their own core
proprietary capabilities from being unilaterally
absorbed or appropriated by the partner. Thus
there is an underlying tension between ‘trying to
learn and trying to protect.’ The dilemma arises
because conditions that might facilitate the learn-
ing process are likely to expose firms to the
danger of losing some of their crown jewels to
the partner. The NUMMI alliance between Gen-
eral Motors and Toyota is a classic example of
such an alliance (Badaracco, 1988). General
Motors was keen to learn some of Toyota’s
manufacturing management practices through the
alliance, whereas Toyota wanted to learn how to
manage U.S. labor and how to run a manufactur-
ing plant in the United States from GM. However,
both partners were also keen to prevent leakage
of some of their core proprietary skills to the
other. Toyota was keen to protect its skills of
small car design and effective supplier man-
agement and GM its capabilities of managing
dealerships in the United States.
Current alliance research fails to sufficiently
examine how firms can balance the apparent
duality or tension between learning and protect-
ing. In this context, we seek to address the fol-
lowing question: What factors enable a firm to
not only learn critical skills or capabilities from
its alliance partner(s), but also protect itself from
losing its own core proprietary assets or capabili-
ties to the partner? In the following sections, we
develop hypotheses that address these questions
and test the hypotheses using large-sample survey
data from alliances of U.S.-based firms.
Before we move on to the next section, we
would like to stress a few important points about
the learning phenomenon in alliances. Learning
in alliance situations can be of several kinds and
we focus on just one of them in our paper.
First, we have learning that essentially involves
accessing and/or internalizing some critical infor-
mation, capability, or skill from the partner. This
is the kind of learning that has been most referred
to in the alliance literature and our paper exam-
ines the tension associated with balancing some
of the dynamics involved in such learning. Such
learning is often a private benefit that potentially
accrues to firms that participate in alliances
(Khannaet al., 1998). Second, researchers have
also referred to learning wherein the alliance
220 P. Kale, H. Singh and H. Perlmutter
partners in the context of their existing alliance
‘learn’ how to manage the collaboration process
and work better with each other as their relation-
ship evolves (Doz, 1996; Arino and de la Torre,
1998). It involves learning about the partners’
intended and emergent goals, how to redefine
joint tasks over time, how to manage the alliance
interface, etc. Such learning is equally critical
to sustaining successful cooperation in alliances.
Third, we have learning that looks at how an
individual firm might learn how to manage its
alliances better, and build what has been referred
to as alliance capability (Anand and Khanna,
2000; Kale and Singh, 1999). Alliance capability
as referred to above may be built over time by
accumulating more alliance experience, i.e. by
forming more and more alliances (Anand and
Khanna, 2000). However, it could also be
developed by pursuing a set of explicit processes
to accumulate and leverage the alliance man-
agement know-how associated with the firm’s
prior and ongoing alliance experience (Kale and
Singh, 1999). Our paper focuses only on the
first type of learning, namely the accessing and
internalizing of critical information or capabilities
from alliance partner(s). Here, we do not examine
the other two, equally important types of learning
in alliances. Thus henceforth, whenever we talk
about learning in alliances, we are essentially
referring to learning that involves the acquisition
or internalization of some critical information,
know-how, or capability possessed by the partner.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Relational capital
The alliance literature has focused extensively on
partner opportunism and most researchers have
adopted the theoretical stance informed by trans-
action cost economics to examine this aspect
(Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Wil-
liamson, 1991). Firms’ concerns about opportun-
istic behavior by their partners are likely to lead
to high transaction costs and it has been suggested
that firms can adopt appropriate contractual agree-
ments or governance structures to address these
concerns. Using transaction cost economics,
scholars have identified two sets of governance
properties through which equity alliances can
effectively alleviate the transaction costs involved.
One is the property of a ‘mutual hostage’ situ-
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ation, in which shared equity aligns the interests
of the partners involved. Since partners are
required to makeex ante commitments to an
equity alliance, their concern for their investments
reduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior
over the course of the alliance (Pisano, 1989).
Second, in equity alliances, the investing partners
create a hierarchical supervision not only to
oversee the day-to-day functioning of the alliance,
but also to address contingencies as they arise
(Kogut, 1988).
Numerous researchers have criticized the trans-
action cost economics perspective on alliances for
its singular focus on partner opportunism and its
advocating the use of contractual agreements or
equity to resolve it. This approach fails to capture
an important element in alliance partnerships,
namely the role of interfirm trust and the evolu-
tion of interpartner relationships (Gulati, 1995).
‘Trust’ has been referred to in several ways in
the literature. First, it is considered ‘a type of
expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s
xchange partner will act opportunistically’
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Offering a slightly
different emphasis, Madhok (1995), suggests that
trust between exchange partners has two compo-
nents: a structural component which is fostered
by a mutual hostage situation, and a behavioral
component, which refers to the degree of confi-
dence that individual partners have in the
reliability and integrity of each other. Similarly,
Gulati (1995) differentiates knowledge-based trust
from deterrence-based trust. Knowledge-based
trust emerges between two firms as they interact
with each other and learn about each other, to
develop trust around norms of equity. Deterrence-
based trust is based on utilitarian considerations
which lead a firm to believe that a partner will
not engage in opportunistic behavior owing to
the costly sanctions that are likely to arise. Over-
all, there is an emerging consensus among
alliance scholars that mutual trust creates the
basis for an enduring and effective relationship
between contracting firms. For example, Gulati
(1995) shows how trust enables firms to reduce
dependence on equity structures to govern the
relationships. Zaheeret al., (1998) demonstrate
how trust reduces negotiating costs in alliances
and also enhances alliance performance.
Trust between organizations has often been
conceived as the agglomeration of trust between
individuals in the two organizations. Numerous
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examples highlight the existence of stable obliga-
tory relationships based on trust between individ-
ual members of the partnering firms. Accounts of
the industrial districts in Italy (Piore and Sabel,
1984), of subcontracting relationships in the
Japanese textile industry (Dore, 1983), and those
in the Japanese automobile industry (Dyer, 1996)
highlight this aspect. The premise is that as firms
work with each other trust is built among individ-
ual members of the contracting firms because of
the close personal ties that develop between them
(Macaulay, 1963). Such trust is based upon close
interaction and relationships that develop at the
personal level. It is akin to the knowledge-based
trust referred to by Gulati (1995) or the
behavioral-based trust referred to by Madhok
(1995). A history of close relationships helps
individual members develop such trust in their
counterparts in the partnering firm. Relational
exchange theory (Dore, 1983) in economic soci-
ology also discusses how personal relationships
based on trust arise and exist between firms.
Palay (1985) and Ring and Van de Ven (1992)
have also pointed out the important role of per-
sonal connections and relationships between con-
tracting firms. We refer to such mutual trust,
respect, and friendship that reside at the individ-
ual level between alliance partners as relational
capital. Relational capital, as defined, resides
upon close interaction at the personal level
between alliance partners. We believe that
relational capital has important performance
implications for the alliance partners. More speci-
fically, we argue that it may significantly impact
the ability of a firm to successfully manage the
dual objectives of learning from its alliance part-
ners and also protecting its own core proprietary
assets from them.
The role of relational capital in learning
alliances
Learning from the alliance partner primarily
involves the acquisition of two types of knowl-
edge: (a) information and (b) know-how (Kogut
and Zander, 1992). Information is defined as
easily codifiable knowledge that can be trans-
mitted without loss of integrity, once the syntacti-
cal rules required for deciphering it are known.
It includes facts, axiomatic propositions, and sym-
bols. On the other hand, know-how involves
knowledge that is tacit, sticky, complex, and dif-
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ficult to codify (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Szulan-
ski, 1996). Von Hippel (1988) defines know-how
as the accumulated practical skill or expertise that
allows one to do something smoothly and
fficiently.
Firms that wish to learn critical information or
know-how from their alliance partner must first
understand where the relevant information or ex-
pertise resides in its partner and who possesses
it (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Close personal inter-
action between the partnering entities enables
individual members to develop this understanding.
Learning or transfer of such know-how is then
contingent upon the exchange environment and
mechanisms that exist between the alliance part-
ners. Know-how, as discussed earlier, is generally
more sticky, tacit, and difficult to codify than
information and thus more resistant to easy trans-
fer, both within and across firms (Szulanski,
1996). But von Hippel (1988) and Marsden
(1990) have argued that close and intense inter-
action between individual members of the con-
cerned organizations acts as an effective mech-
anism to transfer or learn sticky and tacit know-
how across the organizational interface. Learning
success also rests upon an iterative process of
exchange between the member firms and the
extent to which personnel from the two firms
have direct and intimate contact to further an
exchange (Arrow, 1974; Badaracco, 1991). A
social exchange approach provides the basis for
such interaction and exchange. Strong relational
capital usually engenders close interaction
between alliance partners. It can thus facilitate
exchange and transfer of information and know-
how across the alliance interface.
A firm is also able to learn from alliance
partners more easily when the level of trans-
parency or openness between them is high
(Hamel, 1991; Doz and Hamel, 1998). The pri-
mary hindrance to such openness or transparency
is the mutual suspicion of opportunistic behavior
between alliance partners which generally causes
them to be less willing to share information
and know-how with each other. Existing research
uggests that mutual trust between partners
reduces the fear of such opportunistic behavior
(Gulati, 1995; Zaheeret al., 1998), allowing for
greater transparency between the exchange. Build-
ing upon it, we could argue that trust-based
relational capital can contribute to a freer and
greater exchange of information and know-how
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between committed exchange partners. This is
because decision-makers do not feel that they
have to protect themselves from the others’
opportunistic behavior (Blau, 1977; Jarillo, 1988,
Inkpen, 1994). Without its existence, the infor-
mation and know-how exchanged would be low
in accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness.
Overall, we believe that strong relational capital
between alliance partners facilitates greater learn-
ing across the alliance interface. Thus,
Hypothesis 1a: The greater the relational
capital that exists between the alliance part-
ners, the greater will be the degree of learn-
ing achieved.
Nevertheless, certain scholars have suggested that
pronouncements such as ‘build relationships to
create harmony and learning’ are fraught with
complications owing to the inherent contradiction
among the different strategic objectives that firms
seek in alliances (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995).
A potential danger in alliance situations is the
risk of unilaterally losing core proprietary know-
how or capabilities to the partner (Hladik, 1988).
A firm derives its competitive strength from its
proprietary assets and will be protective about
losing them to the alliance partner. Partnerships
are fraught with hidden agendas driven by the
opportunistic desire to access and internalize the
partner’s core proprietary skills much faster than
the partner. These ‘learning races’ often leave a
firm in a Catch-22 situation: if it contributes too
little to building the relationship, the alliance may
be doomed to fail (Khannaet al., 1998); on the
other hand, if it contributes too much and too
openly, its partner will gain the upper hand
(Doz, 1988).
Although the transaction cost perspective rec-
ommends a variety of contractual mechanisms to
guard against partner opportunism, scholars from
other perspectives have suggested alternate means
for minimizing it. Dyer and Singh (1998) propose
alternatives of self-enforcing agreements, which
are sometimes referred to as ‘private ordering’ in
the economics literature or ‘trust’ in the sociologi-
cal literature. Sociologists, anthropologists, and
legal scholars have long argued that informal
social controls supplement and often supplant
formal controls (Macaulay, 1963; Granovetter,
1985). These self-enforcing agreements rely on
relational capital or reputation as governance
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mechanisms and are often a more effective and
less costly means of protecting specialized invest-
ments and proprietary assets (Sako, 1991; Hill,
1995). Relational capital creates a mutual confi-
dence that no party to an exchange will exploit
others’ vulnerabilities even if there is an oppor-
tunity to do so (Sabel, 1993). This confidence
arises out of the social controls that such capital
creates. Partners in an alliance often specify what
is core or proprietary to each party and develop
informal or formal codes of conduct to restrict
behavior or action that leads to the appropriation
of such assets. Relational capital reduces the ten-
dency of alliance partners to break such informal
existing agreements that might be in place. Parties
to the exchange make a good-faith effort not to
take excessive and unilateral advantage of the
ther, even when the opportunity is available.
Thus overall, we can argue that trust-based
relational capital can counteract the potential of
opportunistic or self-serving behavior by the
alliance partner(s) and thus mitigate the possi-
bility of losing one’s core proprietary assets to
the partner.
Hypothesis 1b: The greater the relational
capital between alliance partners, the greater
will be the ability to protect core proprietary
assets from each other.
Conflict management
A critical aspect of any partnership is the poten-
tial for conflict between the alliance partners and
how they deal with it. Conflict often exists in any
alliance relationship on account of the inherent
dependencies involved in such interactions. Given
that a certain amount of conflict is expected, how
such conflict is managed is important (Borys and
Jemison, 1989), as the impact of conflict reso-
lution on the relationship can be productive or
de tructive (Deutsch, 1969).
A number of factors are associated with man-
aging conflicts integratively. Integrative conflict
management entails joint management of conflict
with mutual concern for ‘win-win’ for all con-
cerned (Bazerman and Neal, 1984). It engenders
a communication- and contact-intensive process
of conflict management. Strong two-way com-
munication is a key element of successful conflict
resolution (Cummings, 1984). MacNeil (1981)
and others acknowledge the importance of honest
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and open lines of communication to the continued
growth of close ties and resolution of potential
conflict situations. Our fieldwork also shows the
importance that experienced managers give to
easy and open communication for addressing
alliance-related conflicts. Besides communication,
readiness to engage in joint problem solving and
a mutual concern for ‘win–win’ outcomes will
often produce mutually satisfactory solutions.
Joint problem solving fosters closer collaboration
between the alliance partners, thereby creating a
more conducive environment for future
cooperation. On the other hand, use of destructive
conflict resolution techniques like domination,
coercion (Deutsch, 1969), and an attitude portray-
ing a ‘win–lose’ perspective are seen as
counterproductive and are likely to strain the
fabric of the alliance.
Sometimes the method of conflict management
is institutionalized, with partners setting up formal
joint mechanisms to ‘monitor’ potential conflict
situations. Monitoring not only provides each
partner with a better understanding of mutual
concerns but also enables prompt recognition of
potential conflict situations. An equally important
element of most conflicts is the organizational or
cultural distance between the alliance partners
(Harrigan, 1988b; Parkhe, 1993). Attempts to
address cultural obstacles in an explicit and inte-
grative manner should lower the potential for
conflict and enhance the likelihood of alliance
success.
We believe that an integrative process of con-
flict management significantly impacts both the
nature of the relationship that exists between
alliance partners and the specific outcomes of
interest, namely learning and the protection of
proprietary assets. An integrative method of con-
flict resolution engenders feelings of procedural
justice between the alliance partners, whereby
partners view the decision process to be fair and
just. Such feelings affect individuals’ higher-
order attitudes of trust and commitment (Kim
and Mauborgne, 1998) as well as lead to the
development of positive psychological feelings
towards individuals from the other side. Our
fieldwork with companies like Hewlett Packard
or Corning also demonstrates the importance of
integrative conflict management towards build-
ing a stronger relationship between alliance part-
ners. Thus, effective and integrative conflict
management can be an important catalyst in
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building relational capital between the alliance
partners.
The communication- and contact-intensive
process of conflict management also aids the
learning process. Learning from the alliance part-
er is strongly conditioned by the closeness of
interaction between the partners, especially the
degree to which personnel from the partner firms
have direct and intimate contact with each other.
Two-way communication and joint problem solv-
ing, both of which are key aspects of managing
conflicts integratively, involve close interaction
between individuals across the alliance interface.
Thus it creates a potentially useful channel to
learn or transfer critical information or know-how
between them. Second, perceptions of procedural
justice that result from integrative conflict man-
agement induce easier exchange of knowledge
and ideas between the partners (Kim and Mau-
borgne, 1998). Thus,
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the extent to
which conflicts are managed in an integrative
fashion, the greater will be the relational capi-
tal between alliance partners.
Hypothesis 2b: The greater the extent to
which conflicts are managed in an integrative
fashion, the greater will be the degree of
learning achieved.
Integrative conflict management can also impact
each firm’s ability to protect its proprietary
assets. Conflicts in alliances are often centered
upon issues of asymmetrical contributions by
respective alliance partners and the returns to
them (Khanna et al., 1998). The communi-
cation-intensive process of conflict management
helps alliance partners to clearly define what
each partner contributes or gets from the
relationship and what is ‘off-limits.’ Contact-
intensive mechanisms help alliance partners to
monitor not only potential conflict situations but
also instances of opportunistic (or secretive)
attempts by either party to unilaterally absorb
core proprietary assets of the other. As discussed
earlier, integrative conflict management also
engenders feelings of procedural justice and
trust between the partners to minimize selfish
or opportunistic behavior on the part of any
partner. Collectively, these attributes of in-
tegrative conflict management enable alliance
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partners to better protect their core proprietary
assets from each other. Thus,
Hypothesis 2c: The greater the extent to
which conflicts are managed in an integrative
fashion, the greater will be partners’ ability
to protect core proprietary assets from each
other.
On the other hand, an integrative approach to
conflict management requires partner firms to
engage in close and intense interaction at multiple
levels across the alliance interface. Communi-
cation is also undertaken more closely, frequently,
and openly to recognize and eliminate potential
conflict situations. All of these activities may not
bode well for the firm’s ability to control the
flow of important and critical information and
know-how across the alliance interface. Although
institutionalized means of monitoring conflict may
alleviate this threat partially, they may still be
ineffective at preventing unwanted leakage and
the loss of some important proprietary know-how
to the partner firm.
Controls
Organizational fit: Compatibility and
complementarity
In studying alliances, academics and practitioners
have usually emphasized some of theex ante
structural characteristics of the alliance (Harrigan,
1988b). Specific importance has been given to
the organizational fit between alliance partners,
with the following dimensions of fit being
regarded the most critical: complementarity and
compatibility between the partners (Harrigan,
1988b; Tucchi, 1996).
Complementarity between the alliance partners
refers to the lack of similarity or overlap between
their core businesses or capabilities—the lower
the similarity, the greater the complementarity
(Mowery et al., 1996b). Harrigan (1988a) shows
that ventures and partnerships are more likely to
succeed when partners possess complementary
missions and resource capabilities. Comp-
lementarity ensures that both partners bring differ-
ent but valuable capabilities to the relationship.
It also creates the potential for each firm to learn
from its partner. Moweryet al., (1996) find that
complementarity (i.e., less overlap) between the
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alliance partners correlates positively with inter-
partner learning across the alliance interface.
Researchers have also argued that compatibility
f partners is an important aspect of fit that
affects alliance outcomes. In a study of 90 joint
ventures, Geringer (1988) demonstrates how part-
ner compatibility correlates with alliance success.
He also discusses how firms employ nine firm-
specific related criteria to assessex antepartner
compatibility along several dimensions. Compati-
bility of partners has been assessed in several
ways: operating strategy, corporate cultures, man-
agement styles, nationality (Parkhe, 1993), and
at times even firm size. Compatibility between
partners fosters the ‘chemistry’ between them. It
also facilitates the reconciliation of differences
between partners (De la Sierra, 1995) to enable
open and easy exchange between them. Compati-
bility between the partners allows the firms to
actually capitalize on the learning potential
offered by the complementarity of capabilities
between them. Overall, fit in terms of compati-
bility and complementarity is expected to posi-
tively impact both relational capital and learning
between partners.
Alliance governance (equity vs. nonequity).As
mentioned earlier, a large body of the alliance
literature based on the transaction cost perspective
explains the presence and impact of equity in
alliances. The presence of equity not only aligns
the interests of the partner firms but also provides
a basis for monitoring partner behavior (Kogut,
1988; Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1989) so as to
reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior
by any of the partner(s). Alignment of interests
ue to equity is expected to result in much closer
interaction between the partners. This interaction
should facilitate learning and exchange of infor-
mation and know-how, especially of tacit knowl-
edge, across loosely connected firms (Badaracco,
1991). Various studies have shown that equity
arrangements promote greater interfirm knowl-
edge transfers than do mere contractual ones
(Kogut, 1988; Moweryet al., 1996). In addition,
since equity alleviates the hazard of partner
opportunism, equity alliances are expected to
minimize the likelihood of a firm losing its core
proprietary know-how to the partner.
Prior alliances. Current research has highlighted
the important role of trust in alliances (Gulati,
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1995; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Zaheeret al., 1998).
Since trust itself is difficult to observe and meas-
ure, researchers have used a factor that likely
produces trust as its proxy, namely prior alliances
between the firms (Gulati, 1995). The underlying
intuition is that two firms with prior alliances are
likely to trust each other more than other firms
with whom they have had no alliances (Ring and
Van de Ven, 1989). By generating a high degree
of trust and interaction, repeat alliances should
facilitate a high degree of learning and infor-
mation or know-how exchange between partners.
At the same time, the presence of a prior cooper-
ative history between the two firms also limits
the possibility of opportunistic behavior between
them, thus reducing the threat that one of the
firms will lose its core proprietary assets to its
partner.
Nationality. If alliance partners are of different
nationalities, problems related to cultural differ-
ences, opinions, beliefs, and attitudes are accentu-
ated. Language can also be a problem, especially
if the interface managers cannot speak the part-
ner’s language (Killing, 1982). Harrigan (1988b)
finds differences in national origins to have a
significantly negative relationship with expected
outcomes. Parkhe (1993) also finds that alliance
outcomes and performance are strongly linked to
partner nationalities. Specific to learning, Mowery
et al. (1996) argue that the forbidding barriers
of culture, language, educational background, and
distance with cross national partners should result
in lower levels of learning and knowledge trans-
fer. These barriers have also been noted to accen-
tuate partner tendencies to engage in opportunistic
behaviors (Reich and Mankin, 1986).
Age. We have also included a control to capture
the impact of alliance duration on the variables
of interest. This is because it could be argued
that the greater the duration of the alliance, the
greater would be the learning from the alliance
partner. At the same time, longer duration would
also increase the likelihood of losing one’s pro-
prietary assets to the partner firm.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To understand the dynamics in learning alliances,
we not only studied extant literature in the areas
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of strategic alliances and organizational learning
but also supplemented this knowledge with
fieldwork in a few companies. We used these
two sources to develop the theoretical model that
addresses the research question. This exercise also
provided richness of contextual detail permitting
grounded specification of the framework and con-
structs. We then collected data that would allow
us to test our framework and hypotheses.
Data collection and sample
The level of analysis is an alliance between two
partners. Alliance-related data on aspects such as
relational capital or conflict management are
almost impossible to get through archival sources.
One could collect these data through interviews
with or surveys of managers who are responsible
or knowledgeable about their firm’s alliance(s).
Although in-depth interviews provide a rich tap-
estry of information, it was beyond the scope of
his project to collect data through interviews
from a large sample. Instead, we decided to
collect the data through survey questionnaires
administered to relevant managers across a large
sample of alliances formed by U.S.-based com-
panies.
Given our research question, it was necessary
study firms that have engaged in alliances and
that operate in industries where alliances are a
critical means of competing. Past research shows
that industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemi-
cals, computers (hardware and software), elec-
tronics, telecommunications, and services fall
within this category (Culpan and Eugene, 1993).
To select the sample, we first identified com-
panies with more than $50 million annual sales
for the year 1994, in each of these industries. We
then identified appropriate respondents in each of
these firms. Although most survey-based studies
on alliances have generally relied on sending the
surveys to the CEO (Mohr and Spekman, 1994;
Simonin, 1997), our fieldwork suggested that
there may be other people in companies to whom
we could send the questionnaire. For example,
companies often have executives with focal
corporate responsibility for strategic alliances,
corporate development, or mergers and acqui-
sitions. These executives are more directly
responsible or knowledgeable about their firms’
alliances. These individuals, whom we refer to
as the primary recipients, were identified in two
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different ways. First, we used secondary data
sources, such as the Standard & Poors’ digest on
company executives, to create a preliminary list
of executive names and contact details. In cases
where we did not have enough information, we
called up the company to collect or reconfirm
this information. In some cases we were directed
to send the survey to an executive or manager
who was different from the one we had in our
original list. We dropped cases where we failed to
get sufficiently clear information. We eventually
mailed our survey to 592 companies.
The primary recipient in each company was
requested to select any one alliance that the com-
pany had been involved with and forward the
questionnaire to a manager who was directly
associated with that alliance. This latter individual
was the primary respondent to the survey ques-
tionnaire. In certain cases, the primary recipient
selected an alliance for which he/she was also
the primary respondent. We received responses
from 278 companies, of which 212 were complete
in all respects. With respect to the companies’
sales and employees, no significant differences
were observed between the respondent and nonre-
spondent groups.
Measurement
Multi-item scales were used to collect data on
most of the key constructs. Since little empirical
precedent existed to develop these measures, we
relied on extant literature and our fieldwork to
select individual items for our scales. Simplicity
in scoring was sought by using a balanced 7-
point Likert-type scale that is easy to master.
Basically, each respondent was asked to indicate
the extent to which he/she disagreed or agreed
with the given statement, such that 1= Strongly
Disagree and 7= Strongly Agree. We pretested
the survey instrument with a small group of
managers from different companies before send-
ing out the final version. Pretesting helped us
modify the language suitably and reject items
that were difficult to understand, or involved
unnecessary repetition. The Appendix provides
details of individual items used to measure each
theoretical construct.
The dependent variables, ‘learning’ and ‘pro-
tection of proprietary assets,’ and the key
explanatory variables, ‘conflict management’ and
‘relational capital,’ are all measured using multi-
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item scales. Among the controls, ‘partner fit’ in
terms of complementarity and compatibility is
also measured with a multi-item scale. However,
for the rest of the control variables, we relied on
categorical measures to obtain the responses. For
alliance structure, respondents had to indicate
whether the alliance was an equity alliance or
not and the responses were coded as ‘Yes= 1’
and ‘No= 0.’ Similarly, respondents provided a
‘Yes/No’ answer to indicate the existence of prior
alliances between the partners, where existence
of prior alliances was coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ other-
wise. For partner nationality, respondents had to
give a ‘Yes/No’ response to whether the alliance
partners belonged to same nationality and the
coding was such that ‘Yes= 1’ and ‘No = 0.’
Alliance duration is a simple count of the number
of years since the alliance was formed.
RESULTS AND ANALYSES
The analyses have been conducted in multiple
stages such that results from these can collectively
h lp assess the proposed framework and hypoth-
eses. When multiple-item scales are used to meas-
ure latent constructs and a composite score based
on these items is used in further analyses, it is
important to assess the validity and reliability of
the scales used (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988).
Selection of scale items on the basis of prior
lit rature, fieldwork, and pretesting of the survey
instrument helped ensure content or face validity.
To assess scale reliability, we computed Cronbach
alphas for each multiple scale item and found
these to be well above the cut-off value of 0.7
in each case (Nunnally, 1978). Table 1 provides
the results of this analysis. Table 2 provides the
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the
key variables.
We first used ordinary least-squares regression
Table 1. Reliability of scales used to measure latent
constructs
Construct Cronbacha Items Valid N
Partner fit 0.8165 4 239
Relational capital 0.9063 5 252
Conflict 0.9160 6 231
management
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Variable Mean S.D. PP CM RC DUR LER PC
PP 4.33 1.76 1.00 0.51 0.49 0.13 0.41 0.39
CM 4.16 1.68 1.00 0.67 0.10 0.64 0.56
RC 4.00 1.63 1.00 0.18 0.68 0.45
DUR 3.70 3.88 1.00 0.07 −0.02
LER 4.13 1.89 1.00 0.39
PC 3.98 1.58 1.00
*Figures in italics are significant at the 0.05 level
PP, partner fit; CM, conflict management; RC, relational capital; DUR, alliance duration; LER, learning; PC, protection of
proprietary assets or crown jewels
Table 3. OLS regression
Model 1a/1b—dependent variable: Learning from the alliance partner
Model 2a/2b—dependent variable: Protection of proprietary assets
Explanatory variables Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Relational capital 0.432* 0.498* 0.401** 0.328**
Conflict management 0.374* 0.335** 0.186** 0.184***
Partner fit 0.129 0.110
Previous alliances 0.077 −0.067
Alliance duration 0.035 −0.037
Partner nationality 0.112 0.101
Alliance governance 0.124 −0.120
R2 0.594 0.647 0.316 0.354
Number of observations 212 178 200 178
*p , 0.01; **p , 0.05; ***p , 0.10
to test the hypotheses. Separate models, the
results of which are shown in Table 3, were
estimated for each of the two dependent variables:
degree of learning achieved and protection of
proprietary assets.
The results of Models 1a and 1b in Table 3
provide strong support for Hypotheses 1a and 2b.
Relational capital shares a significant and positive
relationship with the degree of learning achieved.
These results underscore the importance of having
strong relational capital with the alliance partner
in order to enhance learning in alliance situations.
Conflict management also has a significant and
positive relationship with the dependent variable.
A communication- and contact-intensive process
of managing conflicts relates positively to learn-
ing success. Despite relatively high correlation
between the two explanatory variables, concerns
about unstable regression coefficients are mini-
mized since each of them has a strong and sig-
nificant relationship with the respective dependent
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variables. Tests for multicollinearity also show
that each of these variables has significant
explanatory power by itself and that the extent
of collinearity is well within generally acceptable
limits. The tolerance values for each explanatory
variable are well above the cut-off value of 0.1,
and the variance inflation factor values are well
below the cut-off value of 10 (Hairet al., 1998).
Of the control variables, we observe that only
partner fit is marginally significant in explaining
variation in learning success.
Results of Models 2a and 2b, which have ‘pro-
tection of proprietary assets’ as the dependent
variable, provide support for Hypotheses 1b and
2c. The significant and positive relationship
between relational capital and protection of pro-
prietary assets highlights the importance of infor-
mal self-enforcing governance mechanisms in
alliances. Relational capital, based on mutual
trust, friendship, and respect between the alliance
partners, effectively curbs partner opportunism to
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protect against leakage of core proprietary assets.
None of the other variables, including the con-
trols, shows any significant relationship with pro-
tection of proprietary assets. This result is quite
surprising, given the emphasis placed by prior
research on aspects like equity governance or
prior ties.
Instead of conducting the analyses separately
as above, we can use methods that combine
these techniques as well as provide additional
advantages. Structural modeling is one such tech-
nique that can be used. It consists of two stages:
(a) a measurement model that assesses reliability
and validity of the scales used to measure each
latent construct, and (b) a structural model that
lays out and estimates multiple dependent
relationships between the constructs of interest.
The true value of structural equation modeling
comes from the benefit of analyzing the structural
and measurement models simultaneously. An
additional advantage of this technique lies in
its ability to estimate a series of dependence
relationships, wherein one dependent variable
becomes the explanatory variable in subsequent
relationships. It also allows researchers to assess
the impact of explanatory variables on two or
more dependent variables, at the same time (Hair
et al., 1998).
In our theory section, we had suggested that
conflict management and partner fit could have
both a direct impact on the two dependent vari-
ables (learning and the protection of proprietary
assets), as well as an impact on the relational
capital between partners. Thus, relational capital
would be a dependent variable with respect to
conflict management and partner fit and an
explanatory variable with respect to learning and
protection of proprietary assets. Structural model-
ing is well equipped to handle such multiple
dependent relationships. We also believe that in
alliance situations firms face the tension of trying
to achieve the two focal objectives, learning and
protecting proprietary assets, simultaneously.
Thus instead of estimating separate models for
the relationships between the explanatory vari-
ables and each of the dependent variables, as
done earlier, we can use structural modeling to
estimate the two sets of relationships si-
multaneously. Finally, since we are measuring
each of the theoretical constructs using a number
of manifest items, the measurement model can
also help us examine the validity and reliability
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of these constructs, even as we examine the
dependence relationships between them.
Figure 1 provides the path diagram for the
model that includes the multiple dependent
relationships that we propose and Tables 4 and 5
p ovide the equations for the measurement and
structural models based on the path diagram.
In the model that we estimate we have omitted
all control variables, except partner fit, for several
reasons. First, structural modeling is better suited
to examine relationships between constructs that
are measured using interval or ratio scales. Most
current techniques are not well suited to
adequately handle categorical explanatory vari-
ables such as all of our controls, with the excep-
tion of partner fit. Second, our initial analyses
show that none of those controls is in any way
significantly related to the dependent variables.
Thus, dropping them from our model should not
constitute severe problems. We estimate the
model using the maximum likelihood estimation
procedure of LISREL 7, which is robust, efficient,
and unbiased, when the assumption of multi-
variate normality is met (Joreskog and Sorbom,
1988). Results of the analysis are discussed in
the following section.
Overall model fit
The first step in structural modeling is to assess
overall model fit with one or more goodness-of-
fit measures. Goodness-of-fit is a measure of the
correspondence of the actual or observed input
Figure 1. Path diagram (structural modelling)
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Table 4. Measurement model
(a) Measurement model (exogenous constructs)
Exogenous Exogenous constructs Error
indicator
j1 j2
X1 = l11j1 +d1
X2 = l21j1 +d2
X3 = l31j1 +d3
X4 = l41j1 +d4
X5 = l12j2 +d5
X6 = l22j2 +d6
X7 = l32j2 +d7
X8 = l42j2 +d8
X9 = l52j2 +d9
X10 = l62j2 +d10
X1–X4: indicators for ‘partner fit’ (j1) corresponding to PP1–
PP4 in Figure 1.
X5–X10: indicators for ‘conflict management’ (j2) corre-
sponding to CM1–CM6 in Figure 1.
l11–l62: parameters estimating the relationship between
manifest indicators and latent constructs.
d1–d10: error terms for indicators X1–X10.
(covariance or correlation) matrix with that pre-
dicted from the proposed model. If the proposed
model has acceptable fit, by whatever criteria
applied, the researcher has not ‘proved’ the pro-
posed model, but has only confirmed that it is
one of the several possible acceptable models
(Hair et al., 1998).
The first measure we report is the likelihood
ratio chi-square statistic. For the proposed model,
we get a chi-square of 316.19 (d.f.= 177). If the
model is to provide a satisfactory representation
of the data, it is important for the chi-square
value to be nonsignificant (p . 0.05). The sig-
nificance level of 0.02 for the chi-square of our
model is close to the usually acceptable threshold
of 0.05, indicative of partially acceptable fit. The
second measure we report is the normed chi-
square (Joreskog, 1969), where the chi-square is
adjusted by the degrees of freedom to assess
model fit. Models with adequate fit should have
a normed chi-square less than 2.0 or 3.0
(Carmines and McIver, 1981). With a normed
chi-square of 1.78, the proposed model provides
a fairly satisfactory representation of the data.
The third measure reported is the GFI index,
which is the most popular goodness-of-fit measure
provided by LISREL analysis (Joreskog and Sor-
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(b) Measurement model (endogenous constructs)
Endogenous Endogenous constructs Error
indicators
h1 h2 h3
Y1 = l11h1 +e1
Y2 = l21h1 +e2
Y3 = l31h1 +e3
Y4 = l41h1 +e4
Y5 = l51h1 +e5
Y6 = l12h2 +e6
Y7 = l22h2 +e7
Y8 = l32h2 +e8
Y9 = l13h3 +e9
Y10 = l23h3 +e10
Y1–Y5: indicators for ‘relational capital’ (h1) corresponding
to RC1–RC5 in Figure 1.
Y6–Y8: indicators for ‘Learning’ (h2) corresponding toL1–
L3 in Figure 1.
Y9–Y10: indicators for ‘protection of proprietary assets’ (h3)
corresponding to PC1–PC2 in Figure 1.
l11–l23: parameters estimating the relationship between
manifest indicators and latent constructs.
e1–e10: error terms forY1–Y10.
Table 5. Structural model
Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Error
constructs constructs constructs
j1 j2 h1 h2 h3
h1 = l11j1 + l12j2 + z1
h2 = l21j1 + l22j2 + b21h1 + z2
h3 = l31j1 + l32j2 + b31h1 + z3
h1 = construct representing ‘relational capital’
h2 = construct representing ‘learning’
h3 = construct representing ‘protection of proprietary assets’
j1 = construct representing ‘partner fit’
j2 = construct representing ‘conflict management’
g11–g32 = parameters estimating the relationship between
exogenous and endogenous constructs
b21–b31 = parameters estimating the relationship between
various endogenous constructs
z1–z3 = error terms
bom, 1988). It is a nonstatistical measure ranging
in value from 0 (poor fit) to 1.0 (perfect fit).
We get a GFI of 0.89 for our model, which is
sufficiently close to the generally acceptable level
of 0.90 (Hair et al., 1998. We also assessed the
incremental fit of the model compared to the null
model by examining the Normed Fit Index. The
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Normed Fit Index of 0.91 is above the desired
threshold level of 0.90. Overall, the different
goodness-of-fit measures indicate partial support









































Protection of prop. assets 0.848
Note: Threshold levels for acceptability—construct
reliability . 0.70
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for the proposed model. Although not perfect, the
level of fit seems sufficient enough to proceed
with the assessment of the measurement and
structural models.
Measurement model fit
In the measurement model, the first step is to
examine the loading of the manifest indicators
on the underlying theoretical constructs and to
focus on nonsignificant loadings, if any. As we
see in Table 6a, all the indicators are significantly
related with their respective underlying constructs
(t-values. 2.0 andp , 0.05).
Since none of the indicators have a loading
that is so low or nonsignificant that they should
be deleted, we can proceed to assess the validity
and reliability of the construct scales. The sig-
nificance of the factor loadings provides support
for the convergent validity of the respective scales
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Discriminant va-
lidity was assessed by comparing a model with
the correlation between two explanatory con-
structs constrained to equal one with an uncon-
strained model. A significantly lower chi-square
for the model with unconstrained correlation pro-
vides support for discriminant validity (Joreskog,
1971). Table 6b provides results for scale
reliability. We see that the reliability estimates
exceed the suggested level of 0.70, in all cases.
Together, the results suggest that the manifest
indicators are significant and reliable measures of
the latent constructs being used. Our analysis
also revealed significant correlation (p , 0.05)
between the measurement errors for some of the
indicators within constructs (e.g.,d1 and d2; d5
and d6; d7 and d8; e2 and e3; e5 and e6).
Correlated measurement errors suggest the exis-
tence of consistent response bias across certain
indicators within constructs that needs to be con-
trolled for while estimating the model.
Structural model fit
Having assessed the overall model fit and the
measurement model, we can now examine the
theoretical relationships between the underlying
constructs. The most obvious examination in the
structural model involves the significance of the
estimated coefficients. Structural modeling
methods provide not only estimated coefficients
but also standard errors andt-values for each
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coefficient. Table 7 contains the results for the
various structural equations.
1. Both relational capital and conflict man-
agement show a statistically significant (–
value. 2.0 andp-value, 0.05) and positive
relationship with ‘learning.’ This result pro-
vides support for the results of the multiple
regression conducted earlier.
2. For ‘protection of proprietary assets,’ conflict
management is the only significant explanatory
variable (t = 2.318 andp = 0.020). Relational
capital is, however, just outside the signifi-
cance range.
3. Besides having a positive and significant
relationship with the two core dependent vari-
ables, conflict management also has a positive
and significant association with the relational
capital that exists between the alliance partners
(t = 3.50 and p = 0.001). This result may
explain why the relationship between relational
capital and protection of proprietary assets
becomes less significant when we use multi-
stage structural modeling as compared to using
ordinary OLS regression.
Obtaining an acceptable level of fit suggests that
the proposed model explains or fits the data quite
satisfactorily. However, other models, based on
alternate theories, may provide equal or better fit.
Thus, a stronger test of the proposed model is to
test competing models that estimate other theo-
retically plausible relationships between the con-
structs. In our case, we estimated two other com-
peting models. In the first of these models, we
considered conflict management to be an
endogenous construct rather than an exogenous
one the way we have hypothesized. This is
Table 7. Structural model: Parameter estimates
Construct relationship Parameter t-statistic p-value
estimate
Partner fit→ learning 0.037 0.826 0.409
Conflict management→ Learning 0.290 2.629 0.009
Relational capital→ Learning 0.607 4.003 0.000
Partner fit→ Protecting prop. assets 0.090 1.568 0.119
Conflict management→ Protecting prop. assets 0.332 2.318 0.020
Relational capital→ Protecting prop. assets 0.130 1.493 0.131
Partner fit→ Relational capital 0.026 0.907 0.364
Conflict management→ Relational capital 0.519 3.500 0.001
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because theoretically it could be plausible to
argue that better relational capital between
alliance partners would allow them to manage
conflicts more integratively. To test this alterna-
tive argument we estimated a model wherein
we introduced a unidirectional relationship from
relational capital to conflict management, while
retaining most of the other relationships in our
proposed model. However, this model, with a GFI
of 0.83 and a significant chi-square (x2 = 385,
p , 0.00), was an inferior fit as compared to the
original model. We also estimated a model
wherein we dropped both the intermediate
relationships from partner fit and conflict man-
agement to relational capital while retaining all
the direct relationships between the explanatory
and dependent variables. This model too, with a
GFI of 0.63 and a significant chi-square
(x2 = 487, p , 0.00), indicated poor fit. The
inferior fit of the other models increased the
overall acceptance of the proposed model.
Statistically, it is possible to estimate several
more models to examine which of them explains
the data best. However, in this paper our primary
goal in using structural modeling is to assess the
basic adequacy of a model that simultaneously
ccounts for the multiple dependent relationships
hat we theoretically propose, rather than toex
post identify the best-fitting model that had not
been theoretically proposedex ante. It is likely
hat other interesting and important relationships
may exist among some of our constructs. For
example, it can be argued that success with learn-
ing and/or protection of core assets influences
relational capital or the ability to manage con-
flicts. However, these relationships address very
different questions from the one posed here and
future research would need to develop the theo-
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retical arguments associated with these relation-
ships in greater detail before estimating the corre-
sponding models.
DISCUSSION
Overall our results provide some important
insights into the dynamics and implications of
alliance management. Although most extant litera-
ture emphasizes structural factors such as partner
fit and equity to explain alliance success, the
results of this study highlight the need to pay
greater attention to how a firm manages the
alliance, post formation, especially with regard to
building relational capital and managing conflicts.
These aspects of alliance management play a
greater role in explaining and determining key
alliance objectives such as learning and protecting
critical capabilities and skills—objectives that
quite often have been regarded as mutually exclu-
sive. Learning, especially the acquisition of
difficult-to-codify competencies, is best achieved
through wide-ranging, continuous and intense
contact between individual members of the
alliance partners. Relational capital based on mu-
tual trust and respect fosters learning by encour-
aging and facilitating such contact. It also
increases the willingness and ability of partners
to engage in a mutual exchange of information
and know-how to achieve reciprocal learning.
Highlighting the role of relational capital, our
results complement the work of other scholars
who have stressed the role of trust and personal
interaction in interorganizational relationships
(Gulati, 1995; Zaheeret al., 1998). We show,
however, that relational capital is linked not only
to alliance success in general, but also to very
specific and important objectives such as learning
and limiting partner opportunism.
Although some alliance research has suggested
that conflict management is an inherent and
important part of most alliances, evidence of effec-
tive outcomes based on conflict management is
limited. Our study, however, highlights its impor-
tance in enabling the outcomes of interest discussed
here. We see that managing conflicts integratively
appears to foster learning in alliances in different
ways. The communication and contact-rich manner
of resolving conflicts creates a channel for sharing
and learning other useful information and know-
how from the alliance partner. More importantly,
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it also seems to influence the relational capital
between alliance partners, which in turn helps learn-
ing. Most theory also suggests that alliances often
raise the possibility of losing critical information
and competencies to the partner. Such losses may
occur, either because of deliberate and opportunistic
attempts by the partner to absorb such learning, or
because of unexpected leakage through personal
interaction across the alliance interface. Our results
show that integrative conflict management helps in
minimizing such occurrence. Close monitoring of
interorganizational interaction to identify potential
conflict situations also helps detect and prevent
partner behavior that might be directed towards
such goals. Further, we see that conflict man-
agement also enhances the relational capital
between the alliance partners, which acts as an
informal mechanism to check the leakage or steal-
ing of core proprietary information or know-how
across the alliance interface. It reduces the moti-
vation of each partner to engage in opportunistic
acquisition and internalization of its partners’ skills.
Our findings are consistent with the relational
view of competitive advantage offered by Dyer
and Singh (1998), who suggest that trust-based
governance is an important source of interorgani-
zational rents, because it provides alliance partners
with appropriate incentives to share valuable
knowledge with each other. Such rents are sus-
tainable because the relational safeguards are resist-
ant to easy imitation by competition owing to the
socially complex and idiosyncratic nature of the
exchange relationship. Dyer and Singh (1998) and
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) have also argued that
the existence of trust and relational capital between
partners encourages firms to set up idiosyncratic
knowledge-sharing routines to further facilitate the
learning of specified and agreed-upon information
and know-how between them. In fact, we feel that
inclusion of variables that represent such knowl-
ge-sharing routines will empirically improve
overall model fit quite substantially.
Besides having an impact at the dyadic level
between alliance partners, we believe that
relational capital can also play a significant role
at the network level. Certain scholars have argued
that strong interpersonal ties among existing part-
ners create a basis for larger alliance networks
to evolve (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Relational
capital that rests upon such ties engenders greater
trust between partners, thereby inducing them to
form more alliances with each other in the future.
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It also facilitates each partner to form alliances
with other companies, based on the referrals of
trustworthiness that each partner is ready to give
for its current partners owing to the strong
relational capital between them. Thus relational
capital opens up greater opportunities for the
firms concerned to form new linkages and collab-
orations with each other and with other companies
and thereby increase the network of alliances in
which they are embedded (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati
and Gargiulo, 1999).
Relational capital can also influence the per-
formance of individual firms embedded in alliance
networks in several ways. Afuah (2000) argues
that a firm’s competitive advantage is often ham-
pered when technological change renders the
capabilities of its network of co-opetitors obso-
lete. He goes on to suggest that companies can
potentially minimize damage if they have a means
of detecting such changes in a timely and correct
manner. We have seen that strong relational capi-
tal between partners can foster timely and accur-
ate exchange of information across the interface.
It should thus enable individual firms to identify,
better and faster, technological discontinuities that
might hamper their co-opetitors and act accord-
ingly to minimize the damage that may result.
Similarly in the context of startups, Baum, Cala-
brese, and Silverman (2000) have suggested that
their performance is significantly influenced by
the size, composition, and diversity of their
alliance network. Startups with larger and more
diverse networks are expected to enjoy superior
early performance, because of greater and richer
access to relevant information and capabilities of
such a network. We would like to suggest that
while network size and diversity provide a greater
potential for accessing and learning important
information and capabilities, it is the quality of
the relationship between network partners that
enables true and full realization of this potential.
Startups that build a stronger relational capital
with their network partners would exhibit higher
performance, all other aspects of the network
remaining the same. Essentially relational capital
at the dyadic level acts as a lubricant for poten-
tially useful and important information to travel
quickly and accurately through the network. Thus,
having empirically established the role of
relational capital with respect to learning in a
dyadic exchange, we believe that future research
can further examine its role and impact in net-
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work situations, as described in some of the
above situations.
In the network context, Gulati and Lawrence
(1999) have examined value chain alliances
(VCAs), which are vertical links between inde-
pendent firms operating at successive stages in
the production chain. The authors argue that
VCAs are superior to arm’s-length arrangements
or even to vertically integrated firms because of
heir ability to provide high levels of differen-
tiation and integration simultaneously, especially
under conditions of high task and environmental
uncertainty. Integration, which refers to unity of
effort and information exchange between VCA
partners (Gulati and Lawrence, 1999), enables
them to leverage their differentiated and special-
ized capabilities more effectively. Based on our
research, we believe that relational capital and
integrative conflict management can play a key
role in enhancing such integration in VCAs. Mu-
tual interaction and trust that engender relational
capital not only will enable VCA partners to
work more unitedly, but also facilitate easier flow
of information and skills between them.
Before we conclude we would like to highlight
several important limitations of this paper. Owing
to practical considerations, like most large-sample
survey research on alliances we too have
responses, for both the dependent and independent
variables, from just one of the alliance partners.
Ideally it would be beneficial to get an assessment
from all/both partners on aspects like relational
capital or conflict management since they relate
to aspects concerning both/all partners. It would
be equally interesting to examine how these vari-
ables impact learning opportunities and success
of both partners. While strong relational capital
can enhance the learning potential for both part-
ners, actual learning may perhaps differ because
of differential learning abilities of the concerned
partners. Our data do not allow us to examine
this issue. Second, in this research, we have relied
only on perceptual measures to assess learning
and protection of core assets. It would be useful
to develop alternative measures for these variables
using more objective data and examine how they
relate to their corresponding perceptual measures
as well as to the explanatory variables. For
example, Moweryet al. (1996) have used patent
cross-citations to assess learning in alliances.
Future research could benefit by combining such
objective measures of learning with survey-based
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perceptual measures to investigate the important
tension that we have highlighted in this paper.
Third, it is important to recognize that aspects
like relational capital and learning evolve over
time; so might the relationship between them.
Yet, in the current study, we have only cross-
sectional data on these aspects, which limits our
ability to understand the full richness of their
dynamic nature and interaction and to infer strong
causal links between them.
We also believe that there is scope to improve
upon and refine some of the measures that have
been used. This study is one of the few that tries
to examine and measure postformation alliance
management aspects like relational capital and
conflict management, using survey-based
research, and there was little empirical precedent
to develop most of the measures that were used.
Future research can also work towards including
other important variables that might have an impact
upon the dependent variables examined here. For
example, research suggests that learning in alliances
would also be influenced by the learning/absorptive
capacity of the firms concerned (Cohen and Levin-
thal, 1990), or the extent to which the partners
establish knowledge-sharing or learning routines
(Dyer and Singh, 1998) between them. Inclusion of
these variables will improve model fit considerably
compared to some of the models estimated here.
Besides including additional variables, future
research could also examine other theoretical
relationships that might exist between some of the
constructs considered here and estimate whether
models corresponding to alternate theories provide
better explanation of our data.
CONCLUSION
This paper is one of the few empirical studies
that explores alliance dynamics at a cross-industry
level and provides some empirical evidence to
highlight the significance of alliance management
practices such as managing conflicts integratively
and building relational capital. It shows that these
practices can, in fact, help firms simultaneously
achieve alliance objectives that are often believed
to be mutually exclusive, i.e., learning critical
skills, capabilities, or information from the partner
and at the same time protecting one from losing
core proprietary assets to the partner.
To the extent that building relational capital
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and managing conflicts in an integrative manner
are important to the success of alliances, com-
panies can benefit substantially by possessing a
superior capability of managing these aspects of
alliance management. Research shows, however,
that firms are quite heterogeneous with respect to
their alliance capabilities and that this heterogen-
eity is linked both to the amount of prior alliance
experience they have had (Anand and Khanna,
2000) and how they learn and leverage from that
xperience (Kale and Singh, 1999). It has been
observed that the prior alliance experience of the
firm is important in being able to build or utilize
appropriate routines and mechanisms to build
relational capital and manage conflicts. Future
research needs to explore these important research
questions in greater detail.
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APPENDIX: List of items used to measure each theoretical construct
Note: Respondents used a 7-point Likert scale to provide responses on each item, such that




1. There is close, personal interaction between the partners at multiple levels Dyer and Singh (1998);
2. The alliance is characterized by mutual respect between the partners at Madhok (1995); Dyer
multiple levels (1996); Gulati (1995);
3. The alliance is characterized by mutual trust between the partners at multiple Inkpen (1994); Badaracco
levels (1991); Mohr and Spekman
4. The alliance is characterized by personal friendship between the partners at (1994)
mulitple levels
5. The alliance is characterized by high reciprocity among the partners
Conflict management (CM)
1. An explicit mechanism has been established and used to address or resolve Parkhe (1993); MacNeil
conflicts (1981); Mohr and Spekman
2. Managerial interaction between partners is closely monitored for identifying (1994)
potential conflicts
3. There is strong two-way communication while resolving conflicts
4. Great emphasis is placed on dealing with cultural obstatcles while resolving
conflicts
5. The partners engage in joint problem solving while resolving conflicts
6. Top management from both sides is involved in resolving conflicts
(B) Controls
Partner fit: Complementarity and compatibility (PP)
1. There is high Complementarity between the resources/capabilities of the two Beamish (1987); Harrigan
partners (1988b); Tucchi (1996);
2. There is high similarity/overlap between the core capabilities of each partner Geringer (1988); Parkhe
3. The organizational cultures of the two partners are compatible with each (1993); Dyer and Singh
other (1998); De la Sierra (1995)
4. The management and operating styles of the partners are compatible with
each other
Other controls (these three items were not measured with a Likert scale)
1. What was the structure of this alliance (choose one): equity or nonequity?
2. Did the partners have other alliances between them, prior to this relationship
(choose one): Yes/No?
3. Do the partners belong to the same nationality (choose one): Yes/No?
(C) Dependent variables
Learning (L)
1. Your company learnt or acquired some new or important information from
the partner
2. Your company learnt or acquired some critical capability or skill from the
partner
3. This alliance has helped your company to enhance its existing
capabilities/skills
Protection of proprietary assets (PC)
1. Your company has been able to protect its core capabilities or skills from the
partner
2. Your company has been successful in protecting its crown jewels from being
appropriated by the partner
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